The Vested Interest Theory: Novel Methodology Examining US-Foreign Electoral Intervention by Godinez, Jonathan J
Journal of Strategic
Security
Volume 11 | Number 2 Article 2
The Vested Interest Theory:
Novel Methodology Examining
US-Foreign Electoral
Intervention
Jonathan J. Godinez
Western Governors University, jonathanjgodinez@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss
pp. 1-31
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Strategic Security by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more
information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Recommended Citation
Godinez, Jonathan J.. "The Vested Interest Theory: Novel Methodology
Examining US-Foreign Electoral Intervention." Journal of Strategic
Security 11, no. 2 (2018) : 1-31.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.2.1672
Available at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol11/iss2/2
The Vested Interest Theory: Novel Methodology
Examining US-Foreign Electoral Intervention
Author Biography
Jonathan was previously a political and legislative staff member working
in California state politics. He started his political career doing
legislative research for the California State Assembly specializing in
military and veteran’s issues. He staffed political campaigns for the
California State Assembly, Senate, and U.S. House of Representatives
within the San Francisco Bay Area. He accepted a mayoral appointment
as a City Commissioner serving on the Community Services Commission
of his hometown of Vacaville, California where he worked on parks,
recreation, public safety, and open space issues. After his time as a City
Commissioner, he served in the United States Air Force stationed at
Beale, Air Force Base with the 940th Air Refueling Wing. Jonathan
attained a Bachelor of Arts degree from Thomas Edison State University
in Trenton, New Jersey and is a Master of Business Administration
candidate at Western Governor’s University in Salt Lake City, Utah. His
academic interests include political psychology, military policy, and
foreign electoral espionage.
Abstract
News of Russia potentially influencing the 2016 US Presidential election
shines a light on the United States' own history of foreign electoral
intervention. The United States has a tumultuous history of foreign
electoral intervention starting in 1947 with the founding of the Central
Intelligence Agency. Since then, the US has intervened in as many as
eighty-one elections around the world. This article provides a novel
theory, called the vested interest theory, that is used to identify the
vested interest of the United States, or any global power, in a foreign
electoral intervention. It identifies vested interest by utilizing a threefold
methodology of analysis: the methods and tactics of a predator-country,
the stated justification, and the magnitude of the election in relation to
the global power. This article applies the vested interest theory to four
landmark elections in the history of the United States: the 1948 Italian
election, the 1964 Chilean election, the 1970 Chilean election, and the
2002 Bolivian election. With the application of the vested interest theory,
this article develops a unique perspective of how and why the United
States intervenes in foreign elections.
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ABSTRACT
News of Russia potentially influencing the 2016 US Presidential election 
shines a light on the United States’ own history of foreign electoral 
intervention. The United States has a tumultuous history of foreign 
electoral intervention starting in 1947 with the founding of the Central 
Intelligence Agency. Since then, the US has intervened in as many as 
eighty-one elections around the world. This article provides a novel 
theory, called the vested interest theory, that is used to identify the 
vested interest of the United States, or any global power, in a foreign 
electoral intervention. It identifies vested interest by utilizing a threefold 
methodology of analysis: the methods and tactics of a predator-country, 
the stated justification, and the magnitude of the election in relation to 
the global power. This article applies the vested interest theory to four 
landmark elections in the history of the United States: the 1948 Italian 
election, the 1964 Chilean election, the 1970 Chilean election, and the 
2002 Bolivian election. With the application of the vested interest theory, 
this article develops a unique perspective of how and why the United 
States intervenes in foreign elections.
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INTRODUCTION
Why do global powers, like the United States, get involved in each other’s 
elections? Accusations arose during the 2016 US presidential election that 
Russia had interfered with the US election after an investigation from the 
Intelligence Community. President Obama expelled 35 Russian diplomats 
and suspected these intelligence operations in retaliation.1 This incident 
has been in the national spotlight giving fuel to both conservative and 
liberal rhetoric alike, but the United States is quite familiar with the act of 
foreign electoral intervention and political espionage. This article intends 
to survey the broad history of the foreign interventions by the United 
States and propose a threefold methodology that is used to examine the 
how and why global powers, like the United States, seek to influence other 
countries’ elections.
The United States has practiced political espionage since before 
the signing of the Declaration of Independence in 1776 but electoral 
intervention is a more recent phenomenon starting in the mid-20th 
century, near the end of World War II. Since the creation of the Office 
of Strategic Services in 1942 and the subsequent creation of the Central 
Intelligence Agency in 1947, the United States has intervened in as many 
as 81 elections around the world.2 
Research has shown that about two-thirds of these electoral interventions 
were covert, meaning the voters did not know about the intervention 
during the election period. About one third of the 81 elections were overt 
in nature, meaning the United States publicly supported a candidate 
in a foreign election by means of campaign strategy or finance. More 
recently, the United States has not been as involved in overt interventions, 
ending a streak of elections during the Cold War where the United States 
strategically and covertly suppressed the spread of the Communist 
Party.3 There is surprisingly little research in foreign electoral intervention 
thus this work will greatly utilize the new and landmark research of Dov H. 
Levin, Daniel Corstange, Nikolay Marinov, and James Miller. 
OVERVIEW OF METHODOLOGY
The methodology will be qualitative and threefold in nature arguing that 
the vested interest of the United States within a past foreign election 
is determined by analyzing three key variables: the tactics used by the 
United States in the intervention, the motivations of the United States to 
intervene in a foreign election, and the magnitude of the intervention. 
These variables will be analyzed in the context of three landmark electoral 
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interventions by the United States at three different periods of history: 
First will be the 1948 Italian election, second will be the 1964 and 1970 
Chilean elections, and the third will be the 2002 Bolivian election. These 
specific elections were picked are because of their historical significance 
and the range of reasons that the United States used to justify becoming 
involved in the elections provides insight into how the United States 
conducts covert or overt political espionage, helping us arrive to 
conclusions on their multivariable incentive. The range of the dates of 
occurrence of these elections also provides insight into how the United 
States’ decision-making process evolves from the inception of the Central 
Intelligence Agency in 1947 to current. 
Tactics and methodologies (variable 1; displayed as V1) will answer the 
question of how the United States intervened in these elections. They are 
outlined as whether they intervened covertly or overtly in the election in 
question. The motivations (variable 2; displayed as V
2
) will answer why 
the United States intervened in these elections and their justification. 
This variable will utilize Corstange and Marinov’s theory of two types of 
foreign intervention: Partisan intervention and process intervention, which 
is defined later.4
 
The application of these categories will set the foundation 
of which we will build our new theory. The last component (variable 
3; displayed as V
3
) will answer the significance of the why and how by 
analyzing the magnitude of the intervention. The analysis of magnitude 
will consist of two categories: How much of a global impact it would 
have or had, or if the intervention was solely to further the interests of 
Figure 1. The Three-Variable (V
n
) Vested Interest Theory.  
Notes: V1 will identify the tactics and methodologies of intervention, V2 will 
identify the stated motivation of intervention, and V3 will identify magnitude 
of intervention then classify it as globally-motivated or self-motivated.
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the United States. This article proposes to label them: Globally-motivated 
intervention and self-motivated intervention respectfully.
These three variables are applied to the four pre-selected elections and 
given a value-based metric of high vested interest or low vested interest.
Delimitations
This article seeks to apply the threefold methodology to the four 
previously stated elections that the United States interfered. These 
electoral interventions do not include any coup d’états or forced regime 
changes that have happened in the past. It only seeks to analyze strategic 
intervention where the United States utilizes covert or overt methods to 
influence rather than to coerce.
Definition of Terms
• Espionage is known colloquially as spying but in this context, 
espionage is defined as the art or practice of spy-craft, or using 
spy tactics to collect, analyze, or influence intelligence.
• Covert Action in the context of this article will retain its original 
definition from the Central Intelligence Agency as a foreign 
policy tool to further US interests in another country without 
the US Government being fully aware of it.
• Overt Action is a type of action used by the United States 
government that is public in nature, “operations… without 
concealment.”
• Partisan Intervention as proposed by Corstange and Marinov is 
“where the foreign power takes a public stance on its support 
for one side [of an election].”5
• Process Intervention as proposed by Corstange and Marinov, is 
“to support the rules of democratic contestation, irrespective 
of who wins.” Essentially intervening in the election to maintain 
the democratic process.6 
• Foreign Electoral Intervention is the action of one country, 
covertly or overtly, intervening in another country’s election or 
its subsequent results. 
• Globally-motivated intervention is a country intervenes in the 
election of another country for the interests, betterment, or 
well-being of the international audience. 
• Self-motivated intervention is a country intervenes in the 
election of another country to further the interests, betterment, 
or well-being of themselves. 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 11, No. 2
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol11/iss2/2
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.2.1672
5Journal of Strategic Security
© 2018 
ISSN: 1944-0464 
eISSN: 1944-0472
The Vested Interest Theory
• Predator-country is a colloquial term this article proposes to 
define the aggressor country that intervenes into the other 
country’s election. 
• Prey-country is a colloquial term this article proposes to 
define the receiving country that is having their election 
intervened. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HISTORICAL 
BACKGROUND
ITALY, 1948 GENERAL ELECTION
Background
The 1948 Italian general election was held on April 18, 1948 to elect the 
First Republican Parliament of the country. Earlier that year in February, 
there was a communist coup d’état in Czechoslovakia where the 
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ), backed by the Soviet Union, 
forced the resignation of non-Communist cabinet and parliament ministers 
and appointed a new government that was friendly to the KSČ. The coup 
brought Czechoslovakia into the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence. This 
worried the United States and brought speculation that it could influence 
the Italian election and bring Italy into the Soviet sphere of influence. 
There was such strong speculation that Italy would be drawn into the 
Soviet sphere of influence that Time Magazine released a statement 
saying that a probable left-wing victory in the Italian election will be “the 
brink of catastrophe.”7
The campaign was a three-way race between Alcide De Gasperi of 
the Christian Democracy party (DC), Palmiro Togliatti of the Popular 
Democratic Front (FDP), and Ivan Matteo of the Socialist Unity party 
(SU). The Popular Democratic Front was a leftist coalition of parties that 
consisted of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the Italian Socialist 
Party (PSI). Italian historians quote the campaign as being, “the most 
passionate, the most important, the longest, the dirtiest, and the most 
uncertain electoral campaign in Italian history.”8
Near the end of the campaign period, only two parties were left: The DC 
and the FDP. Both the DC and FDP were competing for their own vision 
of the future of Italy. The Christian Democracy was the right-wing and 
conservative party that fought for a capitalist Italy, citing that within 
communist countries, “children send parents to jail...children are owned 
by the state…[and] people eat their own children.”9 The DC also utilized 
religious propaganda slogans to influence voters.10
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The FDP led the de facto Italian Communist Party that had trouble 
controlling militant arms of the party that terrorized parts of Italy within 
an area deemed the Red Triangle.11 The PCI pushed the Italian Socialist 
Party out of prominence and effectively sat on the sidelines with the 
Socialist Unity party. The Cold War effectively started the year before 
the election in 1947. This geopolitical tension prompted President Harry 
Truman to sign the National Security Act of 1947 that legalized foreign 
covert operations. The National Security Act was a major restructuring of 
military and intelligence agencies of the United States. The Act created 
the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States Air Force, protected 
the United States Marine Corps as their own branch, and abolished the 
Department of War. It also set the framework for the United States’ 
involvement in future foreign elections.12
Methodology of Intervention by the United States
The 1948 election was first influenced by the tension ramping up between 
the Soviet Union and the United States. The political climate between the 
two Superpowers was spreading throughout the world and an election 
victory could mean the difference of one side of the War or another. 
The tactics of intervention used by the United States were covert and 
classified in nature. The budget of the project has maintained classified 
status, but the details have since been released to the public. 
First, the United States used financial means to help the DC. F. Mark 
Wyatt, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Officer stated, “We had bags of 
money that we delivered to selected politicians, to defray their political 
expenses, their campaign expenses, for posters, [and] for pamphlets.” 
This covert financial backing of the DC set the foundation of a much 
larger operation. Second, the United States created an influence campaign 
reminiscent of the recent Russian influence campaign.13 Multiple US 
agencies coordinated in writing millions of letters that were distributed 
to voters, making anti-communist short-wave radio broadcasts, and 
publishing hundreds of books and articles all of which were used to 
convince the Italian voter population to believe that consequences were 
imminent in a Communist-run Italy. Third, the US media backed the 
operation and made a public endorsement of the leader of the Christian 
Democracy, Alcide De Gasperi. Time Magazine featured Gasperi on the 
cover of the April 1948 edition and covered him in their leading story.14
The Soviet Union was running a similar operation backing the PCI without 
evidence to prove an influence campaign of similar caliber.15 Wyatt 
estimates that as the campaign neared the election, the amounts of 
Soviet money grew to “$8-$10 million a month...directly out of the Soviet 
compound in Rome”16 The Kremlin has actually released a statement 
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disputing the amount of money going into PCI, instead stating that the 
amount of money was “occasional and modest.”17
The US intervention methodologies prevailed, and the Christian 
Democracy won a decisive victory over PCI by winning 48.11 percent of 
the vote, which amounted to 305 seats in the Italian Chamber of Deputies 
and 131 seats in the Italian Senate.18 The CIA continued this practice for 24 
years after the initial election in 1948, and according to Wyatt, a left-wing 
group would not win an election until 1996- 48 years later.19
CHILE, 1964 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
Background
The United States has a long history of meddling in the country of Chile 
starting as early as 1809 when President James Madison sent an inspector 
to investigate revolutionaries within the Spanish colonies in South 
America.20 United States interests in Chile slowly ramped up throughout 
the first half of the twentieth century as two major US companies, 
Kennecott and Anaconda, grabbed hold of most of Chilean resources. 
For the majority of the twentieth century Kennecott and Anaconda 
“controlled between 7 percent to 20 percent of the country’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP).”21
The 1964 Chilean election maintains a similar theme as the 1948 Italian 
election in that US interests were fueled by fears that the country would 
succumb to a political party that we surrender them to the Soviet 
Union. The Chilean election was a three-way race between Eduardo Frei 
Montalva who was representing the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), 
Salvador Allende of the Socialist party (PS), and Julio Duran of the 
Radical party (PR). 
This was Allende’s second time running for president after losing by 
about 33,000 votes to President Jorge Alessandri in the 1958 election. 
President Alessandri was an ally to the United States during his 
presidency, even introducing tariffs that flooded the Chilean markets 
with American products.22 Salvador Allende made a comeback in the 
1964 election and was a top contender for the presidency until the United 
States found his policies not in line with US interests. Allende’s stated 
intent was “to bring about an “‘irreversible’” Marxist revolution in Chile.” 
Allende was not only supported by the PS, but by a group of leftist 
parties that came together to support him who went by the name of the 
Popular Action Front (FRAP).23
Methodology of Intervention by the United States
The thematic fear of Cold War sympathy, as seen in the 1948 Italian 
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election, remains constant throughout this election as well. The United 
States authorized money to support the PDC in 1962 and after the 
intervention strategy was finalized, the CIA approved $3 million for 
execution of their plans.24 The funds for the election were not only 
delivered to candidates covertly but were also funneled to the country 
using President John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress partnership 
to create better diplomatic relations with Latin America. Using the 
$20 million in the Alliance for Progress partnership, the United States 
sent about 100 staff members to support the intervention program.25 
The intervention tactics were covert in nature and mostly utilized a 
large-scale propaganda campaign to skew public opinion of the leftist 
candidate, Allende. 
Tactics like covert radio and print advertising were primary methods 
of influence and intervention. Later in the campaign, they also utilized 
conventional campaigning techniques like polling voters to supporters 
and non-supporters, GOTV (get out the vote) drives that are aimed 
to mobilize a targeted voter base to support a candidate, and voter 
registration drives used to register non-voters and irregular voters to 
get out and vote. Frei Montalva had an impressive victory, winning 56.61 
percent of the vote. Allende’s campaign was able to conjure 38.9 percent 
of the vote and Julio Duran earned 5 percent. The program was not only 
managed the Central Intelligence Agency but also was a joint effort with 
the US Department of State.26
CHILE, 1970 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
Background
The United States’ plan for intervention in the 1970 Chilean election 
built on the large-scale program established in 1964. The election was a 
three-way race between Salvador Allende of the Socialist party, Jorge 
Alessandri who was independent, and Radomiro Tomic of the Christian 
Democratic Party. The committee overseeing covert operations decided 
that the United States will not be supporting either candidate against 
Salvador Allende, the leftist candidate, but instead focused its efforts 
against the Popular Unity (UP) coalition that supported Allende. The UP 
was a group of leftist parties comprised of Socialist, Communist, and other 
leftist ideologies that came together in a united front. The UP was directly 
funded by the KGB (Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti; Soviet 
intelligence agency) from a personal request from Allende to the Soviet 
Union to provide funding at the amount of “$400,000...and an additional 
personal subsidy of $50,000 directly to Allende.” 27 He requested this 
from his own personal contact, KGB officer Svyatoslav Kuznetsov and this 
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assistance was a known turning point in the outcome of the election.28
The campaign period was marked with violent acts caused by the 
Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), a guerilla movement that was 
founded in student organizations across the universities in Chile. The 
leaders of the MIR were active in the youth branch of the Socialist Party 
where they developed endorsements and alliances with trade unions and 
local electorates throughout the country. One of the notable early leaders 
was Andrés Pascal Allende who was a nephew of Salvador Allende.29
Methodology of Intervention by the United States
The United States’ methodology was notably different compared to 
the 1964 election. They focused primarily on a covert “anti-Allende 
propaganda” versus supporting any one candidate in the three-way race. 
The United States spent $425,000 to produce this propaganda, labeling 
it a “scare campaign,” of which included pamphlets, posters, and other 
campaign literature that linked a government or regime led by Allende 
to be connected to the oppression and failures of the Soviet Union.30 The 
United States also connected with local media and groomed journalists 
to produce anti-Allende articles, particularly through El Mercurio, a 
prominent Chilean newspaper.31
The main goal behind the campaign was to target the distressed economy 
of Chile and add financial and social panic that the country was on 
the brink of a financial disaster. While the economy was stressed, they 
released the anti-Allende propaganda that the United States hoped would 
connect Allende and his leftist ideology with the failing economy. They 
also aimed to break apart the UP by splitting the Radical Party off from 
the coalition.32
As mentioned in the background, the KGB was funding Allende’s campaign 
and the UP coalition directly. These directed funds were utilized more 
efficiently than the US campaign, which contributed to Allende winning 
much of the vote. The then-CIA Director Richard Helms stated that the 
White House wanted him to “beat something with nothing,” blaming them 
for the inefficient funds to run a complete intervention campaign.33
Allende won the election with many of the votes at 36.61 percent, 
Alessandri received 35.27 percent of the votes, and Tomic received 28.11 
percent. No candidate won an absolute majority of the votes (greater 
than 50 percent of the popular vote) so the decision went to the Chilean 
National Congress to decide between the top two candidates, Allende 
and Alessandri, to decide the next President of Chile.34 During the time 
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between the election and the Presidential Inauguration, the National 
Congress seemed to favor Alessandri as a candidate over Allende. The 
United States exploited this by intensifying their propaganda operations 
and having actions approved by the US Ambassador to Chile. The political 
climate of Chile intensified enough to result in a military coup d’état 
supported by the United States in 1973.35
BOLIVIA, 2002 GENERAL ELECTION
Background
Like Chile and other South American countries, Bolivia has a long history 
of political instability since The Bolivian War of Independence in 1809. The 
2002 Bolivian election marked the fifth consecutive democratic election 
after the country developed a multi-party democracy after multiple coups 
d’état in the early 1980s.36 As the Bolivians developed a consistent political 
party system, three major parties emerged. The Revolutionary Nationalist 
Movement (MNR) and the Nationalist Democratic Action (ADN) 
emerged from the center right. The Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR) 
represented the center left. Various parties were founded to compete with 
the three major parties and were successful enough to capture a small 
amount of the votes.
Two years before the election in 2000, the country was in turmoil over 
privatization of water infrastructure in Cochabamba, the third-largest 
city of Bolivia, by the company Semapa. This turmoil resulted in a full 
year of protests where thousands of people marched against national 
police resulting in hundreds of injuries. This protest was known as the 
Cochabamba Water War. During the time that the Cochabamba Water 
War was ramping up, the Bolivian government was trying to eradicate 
cocoa farms as part of a program to enforce the United States’ War on 
Drugs. The cocoa farmers, known as cocaleros, were forced to mobilize, 
create unions, and create a political party known as the Movement for 
Socialism- Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Peoples (MAS-
IPSP, or MAS).37
The election was a six-way race with the three major parties and smaller 
populist parties. The top three contenders were Gonzalo Sanchez de 
Lozada who was the candidate with the Revolutionary Nationalist 
Movement and the Free Bolivia Movement (MNR-MBL), Evo Morales 
who was the candidate with the Movement for Socialism (MAS, AKA 
MAS-IPSP), and Manfred Reyes Villa who was the candidate for the New 
Republic Force (NFR). Sanchez de Lozada won the election with 22.5 
percent of the vote and Evo Morales won with 20.9 percent of the vote. 
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The Bolivian government has an absolute majority political system where 
if no candidate wins an absolute majority (greater than 50 percent of the 
vote) then the Legislature will pick between the top two candidates.38 
What helped Sanchez de Lozada the most was his enlistment of American 
political strategist James Carville and the firm Greenberg Carville Shrum. 
Carville was Chief Strategist on Bill Clinton’s presidential campaign 
that led him to the White House. Sanchez de Lozada was not liked in 
Bolivia because of his United States ties and American accent. He grew up, 
attended schools in the United States, and was viewed as a foreigner. James 
Carville was able to turn notoriously low chances into a winning campaign.39
Methodology of Intervention by the United States
The tactics used by the United States to interfere in the Bolivian election 
was overt in nature, a change compared to the Chilean and Italian 
elections that utilized covert espionage tactics. The Bolivian populace 
was revolting against globalist policies enacted by Sanchez de Lozada 
in his previous term as president that were sympathetic to US interests 
in Bolivia. As mentioned in the background, the United States wanted to 
eradicate cocoa farms to enforce the War on Drugs in South America. 
Evo Morales, the MAS candidate and president of the cocalero union, 
fought to maintain these farms. For the United States to maintain their 
interests in the country, the then-US Ambassador to Bolivia, Manuel 
Rocha, made a statement saying that the United States will cut off aid to 
Bolivia because of its support of cocoa farms.40 This resulted in a huge 
surge of support for Evo Morales effectively leading him to finish close 
second at the election.41
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
The research design of this theory is primarily qualitative in nature 
with supplementary quantitative datasets of espionage expenditure. 
The information used to conduct this research is a range of academic 
documents published by a few key researchers in foreign electoral 
intervention. As foreign electoral intervention is a small, yet budding, 
field in political science, the following scholars dominate the research: 
Dov H. Levin, Daniel Corstange, Nikolay Marinov, and James Miller. These 
researchers have created original theories and electoral datasets that this 
thesis will build off, laying the foundation for future researchers in this field. 
Besides academic publications, this thesis has utilized news media from 
the period of time that the elections occurred. As evident in a few of 
the elections, the United States conducted influence and information 
campaigns where US media, and foreign media alike, endorse and inform 
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voters to vote for a certain candidate. These articles provide insight into 
the methodology used by the United States. Congressionally chartered 
investigative reports are used to analyze unclassified insights into the 
rationale behind some of the interventions. The Central Intelligence 
Agency meticulously documented their involvement in some of the 
elections so when an investigative inquiry was launched they could share 
their own research and methodologies, though partially redacted, with 
Congress and the public. 
The methodology of the vested interest theory as applied to the elections 
is as follows:
1948 Italian Election
V
1
: What are the tactics and methodologies used by the United States when 
they intervene in a foreign election?
When analyzing the tactics and methodologies used by the United States 
it will first be determined if the intervention utilized covert or overt 
action. The information that we will use to determine this comes primarily 
from first-hand accounts of CIA Intelligence Officer F. Mark Wyatt who 
reported the extent of the United States involvement in Italy to Cable 
News Network (CNN). Secondly, what needs to be determined is if the 
United States is expending resources to combat an opposition force, 
for example an opposing political candidate or an opposition campaign. 
Another component to this second variable is if they are opposing overtly 
or covertly against their adversaries. Third, what needs to be analyzed 
is the United States’ financial expenditure on the intervention tactics. 
This information is less readily available depending on the election since 
mission budgets tend to stay classified, though we can maintain rough 
estimates based on how extensive the intervention is. For the Italian 
election specifically, F. Mark Wyatt has mentioned many financial figures in 
terms of United States intervention in his extensive interviews with CNN.42
V
2
: What is the stated motivation for the United States to intervene in a 
foreign election?
The United States will generally form a justification for why they are to 
get involved in an election. For the 1948 Italian election specifically, the 
stated motivation will be derived from F. Mark Wyatt’s statements on why 
the intervention happened. James Miller’s research on Cold War elections 
will also be used to supplement the analysis of Wyatt’s statements. 
The second variable of this question will answer if the intervention is a 
process intervention or partisan intervention. Determining whether the 
intervention is for process or partisan is important because it sheds light 
into whether the United States intervened to support a specific political 
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party or solely to support the democratic and political process. F. Mark 
Wyatt’s statements on the election will again be used to identify political 
or partisan intervention. 
V
3
: What is the magnitude of the electoral intervention?
Analyzing the magnitude of the intervention consists of two variables: 
First is analyzing if the purpose of the intervention was for global 
betterment and betterment for the prey-country and the surrounding 
region or if the intervention was solely to further the interests of the 
United States. These two variables will be labeled globally motivated 
intervention and self-motivated respectively. After determining whether 
the intervention was globally or self-motivated, we can then analyze how 
much of a qualitative impact the intervention had on both the predator 
and prey-country. 
1964 Chilean Election & 1970 Chilean Election43
V
1
: What are the tactics and methodologies used by the United States when 
they intervene in a foreign election?
To identify the tactics and methodologies of United States intervention 
in Chile, the Congressionally-chartered Church Committee report will be 
used to determine the three variables of the first sub-question: Covert or 
overt action, whether they are combating an opposition, and the financial 
expenditure of the United States. Various academic articles will add 
accessory information to supplement the Church report.
V
2
: What is the stated motivation for the United States to intervene in a 
foreign election?
Since there was a Congressional inquiry into these elections specifically, 
the stated justification was published in the Church report. The accuracy 
or sincerity of the justification is something that can be explored later. 
Whether the election was process or partisan motivated will again be 
determined by the Church report and supplemented by various academic 
articles.
V
3
: What is the magnitude of the electoral intervention?
The Church report and a few academic sources will again be used to 
determine if the intervention was globally or self-motivated. Andrew and 
Mitrokhin’s text on the KGB involvement in third-world countries will be 
used to determine the global or domestic impact of the intervention. 
2002 Bolivian Election
V
1
: What are the tactics and methodologies used by the United States when 
they intervene in a foreign election?
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The Bolivian election is different from the other elections in that covert 
action was not taken in the country to influence this specific country, so 
all political espionage happens with overt action and public policy. The 
primary sources that will be used to examine this election are academic 
articles that examine US foreign policy in South America, some that detail 
terrorist or guerrilla tactics, and others that discuss the general political 
instability of the country that led to the United States trying to intervene 
in the election. Because the intervention tactics in this election are overt 
in nature, the financial expenditure and the opposition campaign will be 
easier to assess.
V
2
: What is the stated motivation for the United States to intervene in a 
foreign election?
The stated motivation of this intervention was based on US foreign 
policy at the time, so the research that will be used includes academic 
examinations of early-2002 US foreign policy. The second component of 
this question, partisan or process intervention, applies to this election in 
a different sense compared to the other elections. Because of the overt 
nature of the intervention, the partisan motivation of the United States is 
well documented, so the same sources will be used to examine this. 
V
3
: What is the magnitude of the electoral intervention?
Identifying whether this intervention was globally or self-motivated will 
be derived from the same major academic sources as before and from 
those sources, we can determine the domestic or global impact that the 
intervention had. 
RESULTS OF THE STUDY
The research and data that will be used to determine the vested interest 
of the United States has been gathered in this section. In the following 
section, the research and data will be examined in the context of the 
vested interest theory and a conclusion will be derived to find the vested 
interest of the United States in the four elections that have been selected.
1948 Italian Election
V
1
: What are the tactics and methodologies used by the United States when 
they intervene in a foreign election?
The sources used to determine the methodologies of the United States in 
the 1948 Italian election were statements made by F. Mark Wyatt. Wyatt 
was a former CIA Intelligence Officer who joined the CIA Clandestine 
Service in 1948. When commenting on tactics used in the Italian election 
he stated:
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“The communist party of Italy was funded, in the first place, by 
black bags of money directly out of the Soviet compound in 
Rome; and the Italian services were aware of this. As the elections 
approached, the amounts grew, and the estimates [are] that $8 
million to $10 million a month actually went into the coffers of 
communism…we had bags of money that we delivered to select 
politicians, to defray their political expenses, their campaign 
expenses, for posters, for pamphlets.”44
Wyatt’s comments could be used to answer all three clarifying questions 
under the first major sub-question. 
V
2
: What is the stated motivation for the United States to intervene in a 
foreign election?
The stated motivation of the intervention in the 1948 Italian election can 
be traced back to F. Mark Wyatt’s statements in an interview with CNN. 
He said,
“I was deeply concerned, and I was glad to see things like [George] 
Kennan...saying that, ‘This election is coming up, and should the 
communists be able to form a government, should they win, our 
whole position in the Mediterranean and probably in Europe will be 
undermined.’ And I was delighted to see that attention was paid on 
it.”45
Later, he addressed the spread of the Soviet Union in Italy, he said, 
“what the CIA needed was authority to develop a program of covert 
action which could confront and meet the everlasting and indefinite 
expansionism of the Soviet Union.”46
V
3
: What is the magnitude of the electoral intervention?
When identifying the magnitude of an electoral intervention, based on 
the theory, it must be determined if the intervention was globally or 
self-motivated in nature. In F. Mark Wyatt’s previous statement, that 
determines the stated motivation: 
“I was deeply concerned, and I was glad to see things like [George] 
Kennan...saying that, ‘This election is coming up, and should the 
communists be able to form a government, should they win, our 
whole position in the Mediterranean and probably in Europe will be 
undermined.’ And I was delighted to see that attention was paid on 
it.”47
He states that a “coming up” of the communists will lead to the United 
States losing their position in the Mediterranean. Using this statement, we 
will explore whether this means that the US intervention was globally or 
self-motivated.
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1964 Chilean Election & 1970 Chilean Election
V
1
: What are the tactics and methodologies used by the United States when 
they intervene in a foreign election?
The main source used for the 1964 and 1970 Chilean elections is the 
Church Committee report on covert action in Chile from 1963 to 1973. 
Here is an excerpt from the Church Committee report with respect to 
propaganda operations:
“The most extensive covert action activity in Chile was 
propaganda. It was relatively cheap. In Chile, it continued at a low 
level during “normal” times, then was cranked up to meet particular 
threats or to counter particular dangers… The most common form 
of a propaganda project is simply the development of “assets” in 
media organizations who can place articles or. be asked to write 
them… the covert propaganda efforts in Chile also included “black” 
propaganda-material falsely purporting to be the product of a 
particular individual or group. In the 1970 election, for instance, 
the CIA used “black” propaganda to sow discord between the 
Communists and the Socialists and between the national labor 
confederation and the Chilean Communist Party.”48
Besides discussing propaganda, the Church Committee report also 
discusses other techniques of intervention such as supporting local media; 
gaining influence in Chilean institutions; supporting political parties; and 
direct efforts to promote a military coup. The report also provides a 
breakdown of expenditure of propaganda operations: 49
TECHNIQUE AMOUNT
Propaganda for elections and other support for political parties $8,000,000
Producing and disseminating propaganda and supporting mass media $4,300,000
Influencing Chilean institutions (labor, students, peasants, women) $900,000
Promoting military coup d’état <$200,000
Notes: Figures rounded to the nearest 100,000.
Figure 2. Tactics and methodology expenses expanded on 1964 Chilean 
election.49 
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V2: What is the stated motivation for the United States to intervene in a 
foreign election?
The United States’ stated motivation for intervention is detailed in the 
Church Committee report as follows:
“The goal, broadly, was to prevent or minimize the influence of 
Chilean Communists or Marxists in the government that would 
emerge from the 1964 election. Consequently, the U.S. sought the 
most effective way of opposing FRAP (Popular Action Front), an 
alliance -of Chilean Socialists, Communists, and several miniscule 
non-Marxist parties of the left which backed the candidacy of 
Salvador Allende. Specifically, the policy called for support of the 
Christian Democratic Party, the Democratic Front (a coalition of 
rightist parties), and a variety of anti-communist propaganda and 
organizing activities.”50
The United States also played a role in the 1970 Chilean election but at a 
much smaller scale compared to the 1964 election. The Church Committee 
states, “that effort, however, was smaller and did not include support 
for any specific candidate. It was directed more at preventing Allende’s 
election than at insuring another candidate’s victory.”
V
3
: What is the magnitude of the electoral intervention?
The Church Committee report will be used to determine the magnitude 
of the 1964 and 1970 Chilean election. In the stated justification, we found 
that the report stated the following on the 1964 Chilean election: 
“The goal, broadly, was to prevent or minimize the influence of 
Chilean Communists or Marxists in the government that would 
emerge from the 1964 election. Consequently, the U.S. sought the 
most effective way of opposing FRAP (Popular Action Front), an 
alliance -of Chilean Socialists, Communists, and several miniscule 
non-Marxist parties of the left which backed the candidacy of 
Salvador Allende. Specifically, the policy called for support of the 
Christian Democratic Party, the Democratic Front (a coalition of 
rightist parties), and a variety of anti-communist propaganda and 
organizing activities.”51
From this excerpt, we can also determine the magnitude of the 
intervention and if it was globally or self-motivated. Further, in the report 
it states:
“The U.S. reaction to Fidel Castro’s rise to power suggested that 
while the Monroe Doctrine had been abandoned, the principles 
which prompted it were still alive. Castro’s presence spurred a new 
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United States hemispheric policy with special significance for Chile-
the Alliance for Progress. There was little disagreement among 
policy-makers either at the end of the Eisenhower Administration 
or at the beginning of the Kennedy Administration that something 
had to be done about the alarming threat that Castro was seen to 
represent to the stability of the hemisphere.”52
In this excerpt, the Committee took note of Fidel Castro’s rise to power and 
subsequent threat to the stability of the region as a motivation for electoral 
intervention and political espionage over the course of two elections.
2002 Bolivian Election
V
1
: What are the tactics and methodologies used by the United States when 
they intervene in a foreign election?
Due to the public nature of the 2002 Bolivian electoral intervention, we 
will be using media coverage and academic writings from the time. A New 
York Times article from 2002 details:
“Mr. Morales’s showing is a blow to the United States, which has 
financed a largely successful effort to eradicate most of Bolivia’s 
coca, which is used to produce cocaine… Mr. Morales, a harsh critic 
of the United States, has charged that the American ambassador in 
La Paz, Manuel Rocha, has been pressuring leading lawmakers on 
behalf of Mr. Sanchez de Lozada.”53
More recently, Jorge Dominguez wrote an editorial piece in the North 
American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) detailing the United 
States’ tumultuous history of electoral intervention in South American 
countries. Here is what he says about the 2002 Bolivian electoral 
intervention:
“More recently, the intervention of U.S. Ambassador Manuel Rocha, 
under instructions from Washington, against Evo Morales in the 
2002 Bolivian presidential election exemplifies the same dramatic 
failure. In response to the Ambassador’s warning that Bolivians 
should vote against Morales because of his leadership of the coca 
growers’ movement, Morales’ support soared, and he came in a 
close second on election day.”54
Since this action was overt in nature and the intervention itself was so 
miniscule, there is no need to examine the expenses. 
V
2
: What is the stated motivation for the United States to intervene in a 
foreign election?
The stated motivation of the United States’ intervention in the 2002 Bolivian 
election was the eradication of cocoa farms as part of the War on Drugs 
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under the Bush Administration. Like earlier stated, the US Ambassador, 
under orders from the White House, made a statement saying, “voting for 
Mr. Morales could jeopardize American assistance and investment.”55 
Something of note in the Bolivian election is that the United States 
had unconscious influence on the election by use of private political 
consultants. James Carville, Stan Greenberg, and Robert Shrum were 
leading political consultants who were tasked to breathe life into the 
dying campaign of Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada.56
V
3
: What is the magnitude of the electoral intervention?
Again, using the stated motivation from the second sub-question we 
will derive the magnitude of the 2002 Bolivian election and determine 
whether it is globally or self-motivated. The determination whether the 
intervention was globally or self-motivated. The stated justification comes 
from an article in the Argentinian newspaper Clarín, “I want to remind the 
Bolivian electorate that if you choose those who want Bolivia to become a 
cocaine exporter, it will endanger US aid.”57
During the time of the 2002 Bolivian election, the US President George 
W. Bush and his administration were proactively implementing the War 
on Drugs he inherited from his father, President George H. W. Bush, and 
President Ronald Reagan. This led to orders from the White House to tell 
US Ambassador Manuel Rocha to address the Bolivian electorate.58
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
Summary of Results
The results from the study will be summarized here following the 
previous formats of Election→V
n
. The previous background research from 
Literature Review will be used to answer these questions and determine 
the vested interest. These answers will be derived in the discussion below. 
1948 Italian Election
V
1
: What are the tactics and methodologies used by the United States when 
they intervene in a foreign election?
The research into the 1948 Italian election was able to identify statements 
from F. Mark Wyatt, a CIA Intelligence Officer from the era that served 
as the Rome Station Chief in Italy. Wyatt identified clandestine tactics: 
Political posters, brochures, and propaganda, expenses, and a large-
scale influence campaign all used by the United States to combat Soviet 
influence of the same kind. Wyatt stated that money was coming directly 
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out of the Russian Embassy in Italy to fund the leftist coalition in the 
election.59
V
2
: What is the stated motivation for the United States to intervene in a 
foreign election?
The stated motivation of the United States in the 1948 Italian election was 
stated directly from F. Mark Wyatt. Wyatt stated that the United States 
needed to develop covert action programs to address the expansion of 
the Soviet Union. Cold War fears are thematic in every election that this 
thesis examines, motivations stem from fear of leftist candidates winning.
V
3
: What is the magnitude of the electoral intervention?
Determining the magnitude of the 1948 Italian election first started with 
identifying whether the election was self-motivated or globally motivated. 
This identification will be saved for the discussion, but the research used 
was able to identify a statement from F. Mark Wyatt that stated that the 
Mediterranean would be undermined if the Soviet Union were to expand 
through Italy and potentially through Europe.60 
1964 & 1970 Chilean Election
V
1
: What are the tactics and methodologies used by the United States when 
they intervene in a foreign election?
Tactics used in the 1964 and the 1970 elections were similar and were 
discussed jointly in the Church Committee report but for this portion of the 
summary of results the elections will be separated. The Central Intelligence 
Agency initially approved $3 million for executing covert action, but 
$20 million was also funneled to the country through John F. Kennedy’s 
Alliance for Progress program that was used to develop better diplomatic 
relations with Latin American countries. Besides covert radio and print 
advertising, conventional political techniques were used to influence the 
election: Using pollsters and polling data, GOTV operations, and voter 
drives were all used by the United States to influence the 1964 election.61
The tactics used in the 1970 Chilean election were substantially different 
compared to the 1964 election. The United States tried to develop an 
“anti-Allende” campaign rather than supporting any one candidate like in 
the 1964 election. The tactics used were primarily pamphlets, posters, and 
other propaganda that tried to connect the failing Chilean economy with 
the failures of the Soviet Union in the minds of the Chileans. The United 
States also tried to connect with local media, producing articles that 
were anti-Allende. The United States spent $425,000 for this intervention 
(compared to $3 million in the previous intervention) and development of 
the propaganda.62 
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V
2
: What is the stated motivation for the United States to intervene in a 
foreign election?
The stated motivation in both the 1964 and 1970 elections were also 
identified in the Church Committee report. The report states that the 
goal of electoral intervention is to “prevent or minimize” influence 
coming from the Chilean Communists and Marxists. The Communists 
and Marxists were partnered under a leftist coalition that shared an anti-
capitalist US ideology.63
V
3
: What is the magnitude of the electoral intervention?
Identifying whether the 1964 and 1970 Chilean elections are self 
or globally motivated will come from analyzing the statements of 
justification said in the Church Committee report that the reason that the 
United States intervened in Chilean affairs was to “minimize the influence 
of Chilean Communists” in 1964. In the 1970 election, the United States did 
not create an effective plan of attack against the leftist coalition nor did 
they fully support or fund their own candidate; instead, the United States 
ran an “anti-Allende” campaign that was doomed to fail.64   
2002 Bolivian Election
V
1
: What are the tactics and methodologies used by the United States when 
they intervene in a foreign election?
The United States used more indirect and overt tactics to intervene 
in the 2002 Bolivian election compared to the other elections. The US 
Ambassador to Bolivia, Manuel Rocha, made a strong statement to the 
Bolivian electorate that voting for Evo Morales, the Socialist candidate 
and cocalero union leader would destroy relations with the United States 
and that Bolivia will lose aid because of their support of cocoa farms. This 
statement did influence the election but a different effect than anticipated.
V
2
: What is the stated motivation for the United States to intervene in a 
foreign election?
The stated motivation of the United States in the 2002 Bolivian election 
was a public stance against the Bolivian’s support for cocoa farms and the 
union farmers who worked on them. The Bush Administration inherited 
the War on Drugs from his father, President George H. W. Bush, and 
President Ronald Reagan. 
V
3
: What is the magnitude of the electoral intervention?
Identifying the magnitude of the 2002 Bolivian election comes from the 
statement made by US Ambassador to Bolivia Manuel Rocha. According 
to the Argentine newspaper Clarin he said, “I want to remind the Bolivian 
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electorate that if you choose those who want Bolivia to become a cocaine 
exporter, it will endanger US aid.”65 This statement came from direct 
orders from the White House, who wanted to maintain the War on Drugs 
and keep Bolivian cocaine out of the United States.66
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
This section will take the vested interest theory and apply it to the 
research conducted in previous section. The previous section research 
and the Summary of Results section will serve as the academic backing 
that this article will draw from to form any conclusions. The vested 
interest theory methodology will be summarized per each election and 
conclusions will be drawn from there.67
1948 Italian Election
The 1948 Italian election was held to elect the first republican parliament 
of the country. A coup d’état in Czechoslovakia was held earlier in the year 
backed by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. This worried the United 
States as this coup d’état and propping of a Soviet-backed government 
would bring Italy into the Soviet sphere of influence. The United States 
saw that the Soviet Union was conducting covert political operations in 
Italy as the election ramped up. The United States made an endorsement 
of De Gasperi, the Christian Democracy candidate, and US intervention 
methodologies led to a victory over the Soviet-backed faction.68
Following the vested interest theory, the tactics and methodologies will 
be organized by whether they were covert or overt, did they combat 
foreign tactics, and the financial expenditure of the operation. The 
tactics were covert in nature as multiple US agencies were coordinating 
an influence campaign consisting of millions of letters writing to voters, 
short-wave radio broadcasts, and book and article publishing. All to 
influence the Italian electorate and convince them that the shortfalls of the 
Communist Party were directly connected to what will happen to Italy if 
the leftist candidate were to win.69 
These covert tactics outlined above were used in opposition to direct 
adversarial covert tactics. The Soviet Union was running a direct 
opposition funding the Popular Democratic Front (FDP), the leftist 
coalition of parties supporting candidate Palmiro Togliatti. The extent 
of the Soviet campaign to support the FDP is not well known nor 
documented. What is known is the statement provided by F. Mark Wyatt 
who stated there were bags of money coming straight out of the Soviet 
compound in Rome going to politicians and parties they supported. 
There is speculation that the amount of money coming out of the Soviet 
compound equated to $8-$10 million a month. The US campaign outspent 
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and outran the Soviet campaign leading to a victory of De Gasperi and 
the Christian Democracy; with this information this analysis will speculate 
that the campaign of the United States was surpassing $8-$10 million in 
direct campaign funds- and that is not including the large-scale influence 
campaign ran in coordination by multiple US agencies.70
The stated justification that the United States used in intervening in 
the 1948 Italian election was identified with F. Mark Wyatt’s statements 
about fear of Soviet influence in Italy and the undermining of the United 
States’ position in Europe and the Mediterranean.71 The intervention 
itself was partisan motivated, meaning it was motivated by the 
support of a candidate, political party, or faction. The intervention was 
globally-motivated based on statements made that the justification for 
intervention was that our position could be lost or undermined in the 
region if the opposing party would win and bring Italy into the Soviet 
sphere of influence. 
After analyzing the methodology of the theory and applying it to the 
research that has been previously conducted, it can be determined that 
the United States had a high vested interest in the 1948 Italian election. 
This is based on the use of expensive and incredibly in-depth covert 
tactics that combatted foreign espionage tactics, the stated justification 
of keeping Italy out of the Soviet sphere of influence. The nature of the 
intervention was globally-motivated, affecting not only the United States 
but also the stability of the Mediterranean and possibly all of Europe.
1964 Chilean Election
The 1964 Chilean electoral intervention maintains some of the same 
fears of Soviet influence as did the Italian election. History of US 
influence started as early as 1890 when President Madison investigated 
revolutionary groups in South America. The United States found the views 
of the front-running candidate of the election, Salvador Allende, against 
US interests. Allende stated he wanted to “bring about an irreversible 
Marxist revolution in Chile.” This led to the United States to plan and 
conduct their intervention.72
The tactics and methodologies used by the United States started with 
an initial $3 million for plan execution. An initial $20 million was also 
funneled to Chile through President John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for 
Progress partnership that was used to create better diplomatic relations 
with Latin American countries, though some of this money was used in the 
electoral intervention.73 The tactics were primarily covert in nature as the 
CIA used large-scale propaganda campaigns to skew public opinion on 
the leftist candidate. The CIA did use overt tactics that were reminiscent 
of conventional political operations: Get-out-the-vote operations, voter 
registration drives, canvassing, etc. 
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The primary source of influence, black propaganda, was used to create 
divides between the Communist party and the local union and community 
leaders. Propaganda falsified to look like another party distributed it 
rather than the true manufacturer is black propaganda. These tactics were 
used against the Chilean Communist Party and that will be considered 
combatant operations even though funds from Russia are only speculated.
The Church Committee report touches on the stated justification stating 
that the broad goal of the intervention was to minimize, or ideally 
prevent, any influence from Chilean Communists or Marxists in the 
elected government emerging out of the 1964 election. The intervention 
was partisan motivated since the United States was specifically seeking 
to oppress a combatant or opposing political party from emerging in 
Chilean politics.74 The intervention was globally-motivated because of the 
stated justification that no intervention from the United States will result 
in influence of Chilean Communists and Marxists in the newly-elected 
government; thus, leading to destabilization in the region and Communist 
influence that could spread to other South American countries.
After the application of the vested interest theory, it shows that the United 
States had a high vested interest in the Chilean election, like in the Italian 
election. We have identified that the United States used both covert and 
overt tactics to influence the electorate; the stated justification of keeping 
Chilean Communist and Marxist influence out of the newly-elected 
government; the nature of the justification being a partisan intervention; 
and the nature of the intervention itself was globally-motivated because 
of the United States’ desire to prevent and minimize Communist influence 
in Chile.75 The United States believed that Communist influence would 
become Soviet-backed instability in the region. 
1970 Chilean Election
The analysis of the 1970 will encompass much of the same research 
and analysis completed in the 1964 election but will maintain a separate 
analysis. The tactics used in the 1970 election were negligible compared 
to the previous year’s election. The United States utilized unspecific ad-
campaigns that were not targeting a particular demographic but instead 
were directed at preventing Salvador Allende’s victory.76
The stated motivation was the same as the previous election and 
maintained partisan and globally motivated intervention. The difference 
is that there was great disdain shown with upper-level and executive 
management in the Central Intelligence Agency because of the lack of 
direction the program maintained. Statements made by the Station Chief 
of Chile openly criticized the management and blamed them for the 
failures of the program.77 
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From the lack of direction and focus in the program, the United States can 
be seen as having a low vested interest in the election. Better direction 
may have resulted in better outcomes in the program, but the results were 
simply not there. The intervention led to Salvador Allende winning the 
election and the installment of the military coup d’état in 1973.78
2002 Bolivian Election
Bolivia had a long history of instability before the 2002 election, like other 
South American countries, they relied on US aid for many government 
programs. The Bolivian government was trying to eradicate cocoa farms 
as part of a program to enforce the United States’ War on Drugs ran 
by the Bush Administration. The cocoa farmers, known as cocaleros, 
were forced to mobilize and create unions, of which became a political 
movement in Bolivia. The leader of the movement, Evo Morales, was seen 
as a substantial threat to US interests in Bolivia.79
The tactics used to intervene in the 2002 Bolivian election were solely 
overt in nature, did not fight against an opposing campaign, nor did 
they have any substantial financial expenditure. The main tactic of 
intervention was a statement made by US Ambassador to Bolivia, Manuel 
Rocha, warning the Bolivian electorate to not vote for Evo Morales, the 
Socialist candidate.80 
The stated justification was that Bolivia would lose aid if Evo Morales 
were to be elected and is partisan motivated intervention because of 
the lack of support for a certain political faction. This intervention would 
be considered self-motivated intervention since the reason Ambassador 
Rocha made a statement to not support Morales was directly because of 
the War on Drugs and the problems with Bolivian cocaine interdiction in 
the United States. 
After this more unconventional analysis of this intervention compared 
to the more conventional electoral interventions previously examined, 
differences can be seen in practically all aspects of execution and 
these differences can shed some light on the effectiveness of different 
intervention tactics. The United States had a low vested interest in this 
election given by the lackluster tactics used that backfired in Evo Morales’ 
favor. If the United States wanted to implement a better strategy to 
influence Bolivian policy, they would have had a more comprehensive plan 
of attack with covert operations and allocated funds.81 
Godinez: The Vested Interest Theory
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2018
26https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.2.672
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 11, No. 2
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
This article began with the articulation of a novel theory that would 
be used to identify the vested interest of the United States in foreign 
electoral interventions. It identified this vested interest by identifying 
three main questions:
• What are the tactics and methodologies used by the United 
States when they intervene in a foreign election?
• What is the stated motivation for the United States to 
intervene in a foreign election?
• What is the magnitude of the electoral intervention?
To prove the academic viability of this new expanded theory, it was 
applied to four elections that the United States intervened in, analyzed 
them by the defined factors, and then rated the intervention on the metric 
of high vested interest or low vested interest. 
The article first examined the 1948 Italian election, analyzing all the 
potential Soviet Union influences that could have destabilized the 
Mediterranean and Europe as a whole. It then examined the 1964 and 
1970 Chilean elections where Communist and Marxists parties were 
trying to influence the newly-elected government. Lastly, it examined the 
statements made by Ambassador Rocha in the 2002 Bolivian election, 
its effect on the Bolivian electorate, and how the decision of the White 
House to pressure the Bolivian electorate to vote a certain way with a 
threat effectively backfired and led to overwhelming support for the 
Socialist candidate. 
Figure 3. Visual summary of the results. 
Notes: The variables are displayed with the summary of the results per each 
election.
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PROFESSIONAL SIGNIFICANCE
Being able to identify the vested interest of a predator-country within 
a prey-country has wide-reaching benefits, specifically with the United 
States and other global powers.82 Though this article methodology is 
purely qualitative in nature, its conversion to a quantitative “vested-
interest test” could produce datasets that demonstrate our historical 
regional interests. Using this data and combining it with a regression-
model analysis that predicts future conflict for example DARPA’s 
Integrated Crisis Early Warning System, can help form a historical analysis 
of the governmental priorities of the United States, contributing one 
variable to the larger equation used to determine if we should be involved 
in a prey-country’s election henceforth.
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Though this election has a far more disappointing analysis, and a less than 
exciting background compared to the others, it felt pertinent to include an 
election that the US influenced that did not utilize conventional in other 
words covert means to provide well-rounded diversity to the application of 
the vested interest theory.
 
This is also important because of the scant research performed on foreign 
electoral intervention and that it is a burgeoning subfield of international 
relations and political science. Foreign electoral intervention will find its 
place in the study of espionage, political behavior, motivation, and political 
psychology.
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